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Should Death Be So Different?:
Sentencing Purposes and Capital Jury
Decisions in an Era of Smart on Crime
Sentencing Reform
Jelani Jefferson Exum*

I. INTRODUCTION
We are in an era of “Smart on Crime” sentencing reform.1
Several states and the federal government have made major
changes to their sentencing policies—from reducing the
incarceration of low-level, nonviolent drug offenders to the use
of evidence-based sentencing to focus the most severe
punishments on those who are at the greatest risk of recidivism.
Often, today’s reform efforts are spoken about in terms of being
fiscally responsible while still controlling crime.2 Though such
reform efforts do not explicitly acknowledge purposes of
punishment—such as retribution, incapacitation, rehabilitation,
or deterrence3—an undercurrent running through all of these
*

Professor, University of Toledo College of Law.
1. For example, in 2013 then U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder launched a “Smart
on Crime” initiative, designed to “identify reforms that would ensure federal laws are
enforced more fairly and—in an era of reduced budgets—more efficiently.” U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., SMART ON CRIME: REFORMING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY (2013), https://www.justice.gov/ag/attorney-generals-smart-crime-initiative.
Several states have similar initiatives [https://perma.cc/RBR2-YTY2]. See, e.g., Marc A.
Levin, SMART ON CRIME: WITH PRISON COSTS ON THE RISE, OHIO NEEDS BETTER
POLICIES FOR PROTECTING THE PUBLIC, THE BUCKEYE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY
SOLUTIONS
1
(2010)
[hereinafter
SMART
ON
CRIME],
http://www.buckeyeinstitute.org/uploads/files/buckeye-smart-on-crime(1).pdf
[https://perma.cc/K3MM-DBYU]. Though current U.S. Attorney Jeff Sessions has not
supported the momentum of the Smart on Crime reforms (and has even directly opposed
several of them), many remain on track with their cost-conscious criminal justice reforms.
2. See Levin, supra note 1.
3. The following provides a brief explanation of the theories of punishment:
Retribution: Retribution punishes in accordance with philosophical views on
just desert and moral blameworthiness. Deontological retribution focuses
“on the blameworthiness of the offender, as drawn from the arguments and
analyses of moral philosophy.” Paul H. Robinson, Competing Conceptions
of Modern Desert: Vengeful, Deontological, and Empirical, 67 CAMBRIDGE
L.J. 145, 148 (2008). This deontological approach to retribution comes from
the work of Immanuel Kant. See Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical

228

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:227

reforms is an effort for sentencing to make sense in light of
sentencing goals given the resources available. Therefore,
thinking about ultimate purposes or goals in sentencing is
necessarily a part of the sentencing reform discourse. For
instance, reducing the incarceration rates for low-level
nonviolent offenders is an acknowledgment that the theory of
incapacitation, which punishes based on future dangerousness,
does not require incarceration in these cases.4 Likewise, such
reform measures make a statement about the relatively lower
moral culpability of such offenders, meaning that the theory of
retribution does not require incarceration either.5 Further,
evidence-based sentencing recognizes that using punishment to
rehabilitate such offenders may be possible and therefore these
Elements of Justice: Part I of The Metaphysics of Morals 101 (John Ladd
trans., The Bobbs–Merrill Co. 1965). For another traditional account of
retribution, see also G.W.F. Hegel, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 98 (S.W. Dyde
trans., George Bell and Sons 1896) (1821). For a modern retributivist view,
see Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive?
Retributivism and the Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54
VAND. L. REV. 2157, 2193 (2001).
In its empirical form, retribution “focuses on the blameworthiness of the
offender. But in determining the principles by which punishment is to be
assessed, it looks not to philosophical analyses but rather to the community’s
intuitions of justice.” See Robinson, supra note 3, at 149. See also, Josh
Bowers & Paul H. Robinson, Perceptions of Fairness and Justice: The
Shared Aims and Occasional Conflicts of Legitimacy and Moral Credibility,
47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 211, 217 (2012) (explaining “the crime-control
benefits from distributing punishment according to people’s shared intuitions
of justice . . .”).
Incapacitation: The goal of incapacitation is for “offenders . . . [to be]
rendered physically incapable of committing crime.” ARTHUR W.
CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING § 2:3 (2d ed. 1991).
Deterrence: Deterrence takes two forms – specific and general. The goal of
specific deterrence is to “disincline individual offenders from repeating the
same or other criminal acts.” Id. at § 2:2. General deterrence seeks to
dissuade others in society from engaging in similar conduct. Id.
Rehabilitation: Rehabilitation seeks to impart to “the offender proper values
and attitudes, by bolstering his respect for self and institutions . . . .” 1
CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 4 (15th ed.1993). The
idea is that, once punished, the offender will be reformed and will no longer
commit criminal offenses.
4. Mortimer B. Zuckerman, Get a Little Less Tough on Crime: American Prisons
Are Unjustly Overcrowded, and It’s Time to Change That, U.S. NEWS (May 9, 2014, 1:00
PM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2014/05/09/its-time-for-prison-reform-andan-end-to-mandatory-minimum-sentences [https://perma.cc/6TF6-UX8K].
5. Id.
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evidence-based practices focus on treating the individual
offender through individualized probation conditions, rather
than simply defaulting to a term of imprisonment.6 Of course, in
these non-death sentencing situations, it is unclear what
particular sentencing purpose is the main focus of the reform
efforts. This is because one single sentencing purpose has not
been identified as ruling sentencing law and policy in any state
nor in the federal sentencing system. But, death is different.
The death penalty is a sentencing context in which the
purposes have been clearly identified as retribution and general
deterrence.7 This means that the death penalty provides the
unique opportunity of having focused conversations about
appropriate death penalty reform measures necessary to achieve
the specific death penalty purposes. With current general
sentencing reform efforts focused on achieving punishment
goals while reducing costs, the present version of the death
penalty is squarely at odds with any smart on crime strategies.
Today, the death penalty is being challenged on a number of
fronts—from wrongful convictions to cruel methods of
execution.8 This paper urges reformers not to neglect a focus on
capital juries’ fulfillment of sentencing purpose when arguing
for or against the utility and fairness of capital punishment.
Reforms in the non-death sentencing context can be examples of
how to talk about reforming or abolishing the death penalty.
It appears as though juries’ decisions on whether to impose
death from case to case are divorced from our usual thinking on
achieving the goals of sentencing in individual sentencing
determinations made by judges. Though we do not know a lot
6. Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based Sentencing: The Application of Principles of
Evidence-Based Practice to State Sentencing Practice and Policy, x, 634 (2009) (arguing
for smarter and more individualized sentencing and corrections policies, such as probation,
to more effectively treat offenders than incarceration).
7. “The death penalty is said to serve two principal social purposes: retribution and
deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
183 (1976).
8. RICHARD C. DIETER, SMART ON CRIME: RECONSIDERING THE DEATH PENALTY
IN
A
TIME
OF
ECONOMIC
CRISIS
8
(2009),
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/2009YearEndReport.pdf, the Death Penalty
Information Center (DPIC) [https://perma.cc/4ENU-HH3F ], (making the argument, based
on its 2009 report, that the costs of the death penalty warrant its abolishment). The 2009
report, however, only makes cursory mention of sentencing purposes. This Article picks
up where the DPIC report leaves off by giving much more attention to the failures of
capital jury decisions to clearly satisfy retribution and general deterrence.
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about how juries make decisions, we do have evidence that
racial bias and other irrelevant factors come into a jury’s death
penalty decision.9 In the non-capital context, such biases have
spurred reforms such as sentencing guidelines and requirements
on the articulation of reasons for sentencing. This Article
suggests that similar requirements or guidelines ought to be
explored when juries are sentencing individuals to death to
better ensure that sentencing goals and purposes are being
realized, and to adequately protect defendants. Ultimately, in
discussing these reforms, this Article questions whether the
stated purposes of retaining the death penalty: retribution and
deterrence can ever be realized in our system. When we think
about reforming sentencing in general to better serve sentencing
goals, the death penalty, and thus the death penalty jury, should
be part of this discussion as well. And, if we seriously think
through sentencing reform in that way, the continued existence
of the death penalty becomes more and more problematic.

II. STATED PURPOSE OF THE DEATH PENALTY
A common refrain in death penalty discourse is that “death
is different.”10 And, indeed it is. It is our most severe form of
punishment. It is final. The unique gravity of the death penalty
is what has led the Supreme Court to build certain precautions
into the capital punishment process—from insulating certain
offenders from receiving the death penalty11 to exempting
certain offenses from receiving that level of punishment.12
Certainly, then, the death penalty operates in a context with
concerns and consequences that are different from those found
9. Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Looking Across the Empathic Divide: Racialized
Decision Making on the Capital Jury, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 573, 575 (2011).
10. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976) (“[D]eath is a
punishment different from all other sanctions in kind rather than degree.”). See also
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188 (“[T]he penalty of death is different in kind from any other
punishment imposed under our system of criminal justice.”).
11. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (prohibiting the execution
of mentally retarded defendants); see, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578-79
(2005) (prohibiting the execution of those who committed capital crimes while under the
age of 18).
12. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977) (striking down the death
penalty in the rape of an adult woman); see, e.g., Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 138
(1987); see, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 418 (2008) (finding the death
penalty for the crime of child rape unconstitutional).
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in the non-capital sentencing context. Though the Supreme
Court has given special protections when it comes to the
imposition of of the death penalty, it has also spoken about the
purposes of the death penalty with more specificity than it has in
any other sentencing context.13
From a sentencing theory perspective, what makes death
different is that it is a type of punishment that has identified
purposes. For at least the last four decades, the Supreme Court
has maintained that the stated purposes of the death penalty are
retribution and general deterrence.14 In fact, these purposes have
been identified as more than mere justifications for the death
penalty, they are actually required for the constitutionality of the
death penalty.15 As the Supreme Court has explained, “capital
punishment is excessive when it is grossly out of proportion to
the crime or it does not fulfill the two distinct social purposes
served by the death penalty: retribution and deterrence of capital
crimes.”16 Therefore, when it comes to capital punishment,
retribution and deterrence must be satisfied for the punishment
to remain valid.17 This is quite different from non-death
sentences. In the context of non-capital sentencing, most
sentencing systems operate with a hybrid purpose model,
meaning that no specific purpose of punishment is the focus.18
Instead, sentencing statutes often indicate that all of the
purposes—retribution,
rehabilitation,
deterrence,
and
19
incapacitation—are relevant considerations.
Though such
13. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183.
14. “The death penalty is said to serve two principal social purposes: retribution and
deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders.” Id.
15. Id. at 241 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
16. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 441.
17. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 241 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
18. Donna H. Lee, Resuscitating Proportionality in Noncapital Criminal Sentencing,
40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 527, 528-29 (2008).
19. For example, the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice offers a model for
sentencing statutes that is very similar to what has been adopted by many states and the
federal government. Standard 18-2.1 Multiple Purposes; Consequential and Retributive
Approaches incorporates all of the theories of punishment and reads as follows:
(a) The legislature should consider at least five different societal purposes in
designing a sentencing system:
(i) To foster respect for the law and to deter criminal conduct.
(ii) To incapacitate offenders.
(iii) To punish offenders.
(iv) To provide restitution or reparation to victims of crimes.
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statutes purport to be concerned with every sentencing purpose,
such hybrid approaches lead to sentencing with no identifiable
goals, and therefore, no manner of testing the successfulness of
sentencing.20 Even if a study were to show that current
sentencing approaches do not reduce recidivism, thus failing the
rehabilitation and specific deterrence theories of punishment, an
argument may remain that such punishments may impact the
overall commission of that crime, thus satisfying general
deterrence. If an overall goal for the punishment of that offense
has not been identified, then it is impossible to measure (or to
agree on) whether the sentences available for that offense are
actually effective punishment. However, because goals have
been identified in the death penalty context, we have the
opportunity to test whether the punishment is actually fulfilling
its purposes. To do so, though, we must focus on the death
sentence decision-maker: the capital jury.
Through Supreme Court opinions, we know that the Court
sees the existence of the death penalty as justified by the
theories of retribution and general deterrence.21 What we do not
know is why a particular jury decides to impose the death
penalty on one particular capital defendant. Jury decisions are
safeguarded in a manner that is at odds with the transparency
that we expect when judges sentence.22 In this way, death
sentencing is different. And this difference blocks us from
knowing whether juries are staying true to the purposes of the
death penalty or not when they make that punishment decision.
(v) To rehabilitate offenders.
(b) Determination of the societal purposes for sentencing is a primary
element of the legislative function. The legislature may be aided by the
agency performing the intermediate function.
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 18-2.1(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1994).
20. See Jelani Jefferson Exum, Forget Sentencing Equality: Moving from the
“Cracked” Cocaine Debate Toward Particular Purpose Sentencing, 18 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 95, 143 (2014). “However, simply saying that all purposes should be considered is
in actuality being vague, rather than particular, about purpose. It is a way to hide the fact
that meaningful discussions about sentencing purpose have not occurred.” Id.
21. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976).
22. Paul Cassell, The Volokh Conspiracy: Achieving Transparency for the Grand
Jury’s Decision on the Michael Brown Shooting, WASH. POST (Nov. 19, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/11/19/achievingtransparency-for-the-grand-jurys-decision-on-the-michael-brown-shooting/?
Utm_term=.5af35037d27b [https://perma.cc/E6FB-3DMT].
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Several Supreme Court opinions have given some guidance to
jury decisions, and we can glean from those opinions some idea
about what a jury’s death penalty decision is at least supposed to
consist of under the law.23 However, whether that decision maps
on to the purposes of the death penalty remains quite
questionable.

III. THE DEATH PENALTY DECISION: THE ROLE
OF THE JURY
In January 2016, the Supreme Court reiterated in Hurst v.
Florida, what it had been maintaining for some time—that the
jury rules the death penalty decision.24 That case examined
Florida’s capital sentencing scheme, which allowed an advisory
jury to make a recommendation to a judge who then would
make the final findings needed to impose a death sentence.25
Under Florida law, “the maximum sentence a capital felon may
receive on the basis of the conviction alone is life
imprisonment.”26 Death may only be imposed if a separate
sentencing hearing “results in findings by the court that such
person shall be punished by death.”27 Because this death penalty
sentencing procedure exposed a defendant to a higher
punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict, the
Supreme Court held that it violated the Sixth Amendment right
to a jury trial.28 On its face, this case is about who (the judge or
the jury) weighs facts that will increase a defendant’s
punishment. In deciding this case, the Court does not mention
the purposes of the death penalty, nor does it get into how the
jury’s decision to recommend a death sentence must be based on
those purposes. But, what this opinion does highlight is how the
structure of death penalty decisions is supposed to only allow for
death when certain factors are found that indicate that the

23. Mark Sherman, Supreme Court Upends All-White Jury Verdict, Death Sentence,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(May
23,
2016,
1:30
PM),
http://www.bigstory.ap.org/article/07d41c5db5bb4123bfa6fc8340de5c8f/supreme-courtthrows-out-death-sentence-all-white-jury [https://perma.cc/3XPU-DR9J].
24. Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 619 (2016).
25. Id. at 620.
26. Id.
27. Id. (citing Fla. State. § 775.082(1)).
28. Id. at 621-24.
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defendant is the worst of the worst offender.29 This is why states
like Florida only authorize the conviction for a capital offense to
carry life imprisonment, and require the finding of additional
aggravating factors in order for death to be imposed on the
defendant.30 In Hurst’s case, the advisory jury was instructed
that it could recommend a death sentence if it found beyond a
reasonable doubt “that the murder was especially ‘heinous,
atrocious, or cruel’ or that it occurred while Hurst was
committing a robbery.”31 These aggravating factors arguably
map onto both the retributive and deterrent goals of the death
penalty. The argument would be that those who commit
murders in an unusually cruel manner are the worst types of
murderers there are, and therefore, they are morally deserving of
the death penalty. Those who commit murder during the
commission of a robbery deserve death in order to signal to
other criminals that this type of scenario will warrant a sentence
of death, thus serving the deterrent function of the death penalty.
In Hurst’s case, without specifying its findings, the jury
recommended death by a vote of seven to five.32 After receiving
the advisory jury’s recommendation, the judge wrote an order
explicitly stating that she decided to impose the death penalty
partially based on her own determination that both aggravating
factors existed.33 Arguably, then, the purposes of the death
penalty were fulfilled by the imposition of death in this
particular case. However, as the Supreme Court made clear in
its holding, when a state has acknowledged that death can only
be imposed when certain aggravating factors are present, it must
be the jury, and not the judge, who finds the existence of those
facts that make death appropriate.34 In other words, in these
types of situations, it must be the jury who finds that retribution
and/or deterrence require the imposition of the death penalty in
an individual case. In this sense, the capital jury’s decision
should be a purpose-focused one.

29. Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 620-22.
30. Id. at 620.
31. Id. (citing the lower court).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 624 (“Florida’s sentencing scheme, which required the judge
alone to find the existence of an aggravating circumstance, is therefore unconstitutional.”).
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This purpose-focused undercurrent of even Sixth
Amendment jury right decisions in death penalty cases is
supported by Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Ring v. Arizona.35
Similar to the situation in Hurst, Ring concerned an Arizona
statute that allowed for the trial judge, after a jury adjudication
of guilty, to determine the presence or absence of aggravating
factors required for the imposition of the death penalty.36 The
main difference between Hurst and Ring is that in Arizona there
was no use of an advisory jury the way there was in Florida.37 In
deciding that the Florida scheme violated the Sixth Amendment
in Hurst, the Supreme Court partially relied on its finding of a
Sixth Amendment jury trial right violation in Ring.38 Like in
Hurst, in Ring the Court found that it was impermissible for a
judge to find aggravating factors necessary to impose the death
penalty when the jury’s verdict alone only allowed for life
imprisonment.39 However, in his concurrence, Justice Breyer
highlighted the function of the jury in ensuring that the
imposition of the death penalty in a specific case was fulfilling
the purposes of capital punishment.40 He focused on what he
saw as an Eighth Amendment requirement of jury sentencing in
death penalty cases.41 Though he dismissed the possibility of the
death penalty to deter capital crimes, Justice Breyer found the
jury essential to carrying out the remaining retributive
justification for capital punishment.42 As he explained:
In respect to retribution, jurors possess an important
comparative advantage over judges. In principle, they are
more attuned to “the community’s moral sensibility,”
because they “reflect more accurately the composition and
experiences of the community as a whole[.]” Hence they
are more likely to “express the conscience of the
community on the ultimate question of life or death,”[] and
35. 536 U.S. 584, 614-16 (2002).
36. Id. at 588.
37. Id. at 607-08.
38. Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 621-22.
39. Ring, 536 U.S. at 607-09.
40. Id. at 615-16.
41. Ring, 536 U.S. at 613-14 (Breyer, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 614-15 (“As to the first, I note the continued difficulty of justifying capital
punishment in terms of its ability to deter crime, to incapacitate offenders, or to rehabilitate
criminals. Studies of deterrence are, at most, inconclusive.”).
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better able to determine in the particular case the need for
retribution, namely, “an expression of the community’s
belief that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an
affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be
the penalty of death.”43

Thus, like Breyer, we can focus on the Eighth
Amendment’s promise of freedom from cruel and unusual
punishment; or, as the majorities do in Hurst and Ring, we can
focus on the Sixth Amendment’s assurance that a jury will find
any sentencing factors that would increase the conviction
penalty of life imprisonment to death. Either way, an underlying
concept is that the decision regarding the fulfillment of the
purposes of the death penalty belongs in the hands of the jurors.
Therefore, if we are going to make a purpose-centered argument
about death penalty reform or abolition, the focus must be on the
jury decision. But, how do juries make the decision to impose
death?

IV. WHEN THE DECISION IS DEATH: WHAT
DOES THE CAPITAL JURY DECISION ENTAIL?
Though jury decisions on sentencing remain largely selfdirected, the Supreme Court has put constitutional limitations on
the death penalty decision.44 One thing we know is that if the
death penalty is on the table, juries have to actually make a
decision between life imprisonment and death. We know this
because the death penalty cannot be mandatory upon conviction
of a capital crime.45 This means that juries must consider
something when they decide to impose the death penalty. When
it comes to those factors for consideration, we know that juries
must consider all relevant mitigating evidence that a defendant
presents.46 Oftentimes, specific mitigating factors that juries are
43. Id. at 615-16 (internal citations omitted).
44. Stephen Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 30-31 (1980).
45. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976); see also Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 335-36 (1976).
46. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 536, 605 (1978) (“[A] statute that prevents the
sentencer in all capital cases from giving independent mitigating weight to aspects of the
defendant’s character and record and to circumstances of the offense proffered in
mitigation creates the risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which
may call for a less severe penalty.”).
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to look for in the evidence presented are delineated by statute.47
In some fashion, which varies in form by jurisdiction, juries are
also directed to consider aggravating factors.48 Therefore,
despite all that we do not know about the capital jury decision,
we do know that it is meant to be a reasoned, guided decision.
We also know that juries are in fact fulfilling this
obligation to make a decision between life imprisonment and the
death penalty, rather than just defaulting to applying the death
penalty simply because prosecutors are seeking the punishment.
In the federal system, when juries reached the point of deciding
punishment in a capital case, they imposed life sentences sixtyfive percent of the time and imposed death sentences thirty-five
47. See, for example, Florida Statutes Annotated §921.141(7), which lists the
mitigating factors that should be considered as:
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
(b) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant’s conduct or consented to
the act.
(d) The defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony committed by
another person and his or her participation was relatively minor.
(e) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial
domination of another person.
(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his or her
conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of law was
substantially impaired.
(g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
(h) The existence of any other factors in the defendant’s background that
would mitigate against imposition of the death penalty.
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(7) (West 2016).
48. Three types of death penalty statutes have survived constitutional scrutiny:
“threshold,” “balancing,” and “directed” statutes. See William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury
Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview of Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043, 1046 (1995)
(citing Stephen Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1980)). In Gregg v.
Georgia, the Supreme Court upheld Georgia’s threshold statute, which required jurors to
find at least one aggravating factor from a list specified in the statute before imposing a
death sentence. 428 U.S. 153, 188-195 (1976). Additionally, in Proffitt v. Florida, the
Court upheld Florida’s balancing statute, which required jurors to weigh aggravating
factors against mitigating factors listed in the statute in making their sentencing decision.
428 U.S. 242, 251-58 (1976). Lastly, in Jurek v. Texas, the Court upheld Texas’ directed
statute, which restricted findings of death to the jury’s affirmative answer on three
propositions: the likely future dangerousness of the defendant, the defendant’s intent to
kill or level of responsibility for the victim’s death, and the existence of any mitigating
circumstances which would warrant a life sentence. 428 U.S. 262, 268-76 (1976). Other
states have adopted some version of the threshold, balancing, and directed statutes upheld
in Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek. Bowers, supra note 48, at 1049.
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percent of the time.49 Across the country, recent numbers show
that the imposition of death sentences are on a decline.50 From
this information, we can infer that a decision is being made
between capital offenders who deserve death and those who do
not. What we do not know is why a capital jury decides to
impose the death penalty in any particular case as opposed to
others in which life imprisonment is imposed. If retribution and
deterrence justify the existence of death as a punishment, then
the factors that a capital jury uses to make its decision between
life imprisonment and the death penalty should by related to
those purposes as well. But, what we know about the death
penalty decision outcomes belies this presumption.

A. The Presence of Racial Bias
When juries do make the decision to impose death, there is
much we do not know about what motivates them to do so.
However, we do we know a few things about who ultimately
ends up receiving the death penalty. Overall, a jury is much
more likely to sentence a defendant to death in cases involving a
white victim than if the victim is of any other race. Current data
shows that although only 50% of murder victims are white, over
75% of murder victims in cases resulting in a death sentence are
white.51 When this is broken down by state, a racialized pattern
in death penalty decisions is even more evident. Researchers
have found that in Louisiana a defendant’s odds of receiving a
death sentence were 97% higher if the victim was white than if

49. Federal Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER (June 23,
2016), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/federal-death-penalty [https://perma.cc/CFF8A8V2].
50. See Richard C. Dieter, The 2% Death Penalty: How a Minority of Counties
Produce Most Death Cases at Enormous Costs to All, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION
CENTER, 1(Oct. 2013), http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/TwoPercentReport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/72BT-8T4K]. While some of this decline in the use of the death penalty
would be due to jurors not imposing the death penalty at a high rate, it is true that some of
this trend would also be due to prosecutors seeking the death penalty less often than in the
past.
51. Facts About the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, (last
updated Feb. 2, 2017), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DM8V-B26Y]. Admittedly, some of this disparity is also due to
disparate prosecutorial decisions about when to seek the death penalty.
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the person killed was black.52 In California, those who killed
whites were found to be three times more likely to be sentenced
to death than those with black victims, and over four times more
likely to receive a death sentence than those who killed
Latinos.53 The statistics show similar results in North Carolina
where a defendant’s odds of receiving a death sentence
increased by 3.5 times if the victim was white.54 And though the
race of the victim seems to be the prevailing statistic
determining the likelihood of the death penalty being imposed,
the race of the defendant can make a difference as well. For
instance, a recent study concluded that jurors in Washington
State are three times more likely to find a death sentence
appropriate for a black defendant than for a white defendant,
even in similar cases.55 These numbers speak volumes about
what factors motivate juror decisions to impose death. This is
especially true when we consider the statistics for persons
executed for interracial murders: twenty cases of a white
defendant killing a black victim compared to a relatively
staggering 284 cases of a black defendant killing a white
victim.56 When it comes to the death penalty, race matters.57
52. Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L Radelet, Death Sentencing in East Baton Rouge
Parish, 1990-2008, 71 LA. L. REV. 647, 669-70 (2001).
53. Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, Empirical Analysis: The Impact of
Legally Inappropriate Factors on Death Sentencing for California Homicides, 1990-1999,
46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 19 (2005).
54. John C. Boger & Dr. Isaac Unah, Race and the Death Penalty in North Carolina,
An
Empirical
Analysis:
1993-1997,
4
(April
2011),
http://www.unc.edu/~jcboger/NCDeathPenaltyReport2001.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VAZ32PKG].
55. Katherine Beckett, The Role of Race in Washington State Capital Sentencing,
1981-2002 (Jan. 2014), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/WashRaceStudy2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q4AY-NTSB].
56. Facts About the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, (last
updated Feb. 2, 2017), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DM8V-B26Y].
57. Several scholarly articles and studies confirm this racialized aspect of the death
penalty. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Race and the Death Penalty Before and After
McCleskey, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 34, 38-40 n.21 (2007) (“Most of the studies
find that the race of the victim is the principal determiner of sentence: killers of white
victims are far more likely to be sentenced to death than killers of African-American
victims.”); see also Mona Lynch, supra note 9, at 577 (“Several recent studies have
documented racial bias against Black defendants, apart from the interactive effect that the
race of defendant has with the race of victim.”). See David C. Baldus et al., Racial
Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal
Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638, 1726
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If these racialized results were simply byproducts of an
otherwise effective capital punishment approach, the disparities
would be disturbing enough. However, given that race plays a
part in the predictability of the imposition of the death penalty
and that we have little to no indication that the purposes of the
death penalty are actually being considered when death is
imposed, the death penalty stands as a racially unjust
punishment option that also fails to fulfill the smart on crime
agenda. A closer look at the stated purposes of the death penalty
reveals huge questions about whether capital juries’ decisions
have anything to do with current sentencing reform goals of
fulfilling these purposes in a more fiscally responsible manner.

B. Retribution
One would think that the most obvious reason for a jury to
impose the death penalty in a particular case is to effectuate
retribution. One can understand retribution as focusing on the
community’s view of blameworthiness and proportionality
among offenses and offenders, which can be studied through
polls and surveys.58 The Supreme Court has explained that
“capital punishment must ‘be limited to those offenders who
commit “a narrow category of the most serious crimes” and
whose extreme culpability makes them “the most deserving of
execution.”‘“59 The mitigating and aggravating factors that
juries consider in the capital sentencing decision are designed to
identify the worst of the worst offenders. It stands to reason,
(1998); Samuel R. Gross & Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial
Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REV. 27, 10506 (1984) (finding “remarkably stable and consistent” race-of-victim effects “in the
imposition of the death penalty under post-Furman statutes in the eight states that [the
authors] examined” and explaining that “[t]he legitimate sentencing variables that [they]
considered could not explain these disparities, whether [they] controlled for these variables
one at a time, organized them into a scale of aggravation, or used multiple regression
analysis”).
58. Empirical retribution “focuses on the blameworthiness of the offender. But in
determining the principles by which punishment is to be assessed, it looks not to
philosophical analyses but rather to the community’s intuitions of justice.” Robinson,
supra note 3, at 149. See also, Bowers & Robinson, supra note 3, at 217 (explaining “the
crime-control benefits from distributing punishment according to people’s shared intuitions
of justice”).
59. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008) (internal citations omitted;
citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005).).
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then, that juries decide to sentence offenders to death when they
are convinced that those aggravating factors indicate a level of a
defendant’s moral blameworthiness for which a life sentence
would be an insufficient sanction. However, this mathematical
view of weighing mitigating and aggravating factors is likely too
simplistic. A better explanation is that “[a]t the penalty phase of
a capital case, the central issue is no longer a factual inquiry into
whether the defendant committed any crimes; it is the highlycharged moral and emotional issue of whether the defendant,
notwithstanding his crimes, is a person who should continue to
live.”60 In other words, if the theory of retribution were guiding
a capital jury’s sentencing decision, then death would only be
imposed in situations in which life imprisonment would not
adequately express the jury’s moral outrage regarding the crime
and the criminal. A closer look at what goes into the capital
jury’s decisions, indicating confusion and bias, puts the
retributive authority of the jury in question.

1. The Problem of Jury Confusion
Data compiled by the Capital Jury Project is especially
helpful in assessing the role that retribution plays in a jury’s
decision to impose death. The Capital Jury Project (CJP) was
initiated in 1991 by a group of university-based researchers from
fourteen states and describes itself as “a program of research on
how persons who serve as jurors on capital cases make the life
or death sentencing decision.”61 Its purpose was “to determine
whether jurors’ exercise of capital sentencing discretion under
modern capital statutes conforms to constitutional standards,
whether these statutes have remedied the arbitrariness ruled
unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court[.]”62 To make such
determinations, the CJP undertook in-depth personal interviews
of over 1000 juries from over 300 capital trials throughout the
fourteen states involved.63 These interviews were “designed to:
60. See Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in
Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 334-35 (1983).
61. What is the Capital Jury Project, School of Criminal Justice, Univ. at Albany,
http://www.albany.edu/scj/13189.php [https://perma.cc/3T4X-E73W].
62. Id.
63. Id. These states include Alabama, California, Florida, Georgia, Indiana,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas and Virginia. Id.
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(1) systematically describe jurors’ exercise of capital sentencing
discretion; (2) assess the extent of arbitrariness in jurors’
exercise of such discretion; and (3) evaluate the efficacy of
capital statutes in controlling such arbitrariness.”64 The results
of the CJP data are nearly eighty journal articles and book
chapters analyzing the data and making various conclusions
about capital jury decision-making. A look at those analyses
reveals that jurors’ decisions to impose death do not clearly map
on to the stated purposes of the death penalty. This is especially
true when retribution is at issue.
One article analyzing the CJP data indicated that jurors
often thought that the presence of aggravating sentencing factors
meant that the death penalty was required.65 Some even thought
that the fact that the defendant had been found guilty of a capital
crime at all required them to impose the death penalty.66 Of
course, this is not what the law allows—a death sentence cannot
be mandatory upon conviction,67 and jurors must give some
consideration to mitigating evidence in deciding whether to
impose death, even in the presence of aggravating factors.68
Most of this confusion was due to misunderstandings about the
jury instructions given at the sentencing phase.69 Even though,
in accordance with the law, jurors were instructed that they must
give weight to mitigating evidence, the CJP data showed that
jurors either did not think about mitigating evidence at all, or did
not understand the role that mitigating evidence was to play in
the sentencing decision.70 Rather than considering whether
mitigating evidence justified a sentence less than death—in
other words, was there anything morally redeemable about the
defendant such that retribution could be served by a life
sentence—some jurors simply dismissed such evidence as “no
excuse for the murder.”71 While these mistakes were certainly at
64. Id.
65. Ursula Bentele & William J. Bowers, How Jurors Decide on Death: Guilt is
Overwhelming; Aggravation Requires Death; and Mitigation Is No Excuse, 66 BROOK. L.
REV. 1011, 1031-37 (2001).
66. Id.
67. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976); see also Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976).
68. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978).
69. See Bentele & Bowers, supra note 65, at 1062-63.
70. Id. at 1041-42.
71. Id. at 1042.
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odds with the constitutional requirements for imposing the death
penalty, they also indicate that jurors’ decisions are not
reflecting thought about the retributive purpose of the death
penalty. If a jury thinks that the death penalty is legally required
because of the presence of aggravating factors, or if that jury
believes that mitigating evidence is irrelevant to the death
penalty decision, then that juror is not trying to figure out
whether retribution requires the death penalty in that particular
case. Likewise, we cannot assume that a decision to impose
death is any indication of a jury’s sense of retributive desert for
the offender. Instead, it seems that jurors often think that the
legislature (or in some cases, the judge) has already made this
decision for them, and their job is merely to carry out the predetermined sentence once certain aggravating factors are found.
This, of course, is already an error. But, looking even more
deeply into how a jury decides that those ever-weighty
aggravating factors exist is wrought with injustice.

2. The Problem of Racial Bias . . . Again
Another problem with the assumption that capital jurors are
expressing a need for retribution when they sentence a defendant
to death is the racial bias issue that was previously discussed.
Some scholars have argued that the reason for these racially
disparate jury decisions is that capital jurors, who are mostly
male and mostly white,72 may not be able to identify with black
capital defendants and may identify more with the victim when
the victim is white.73 In other words, “jurors may have a
difficult time empathizing with mitigating evidence presented by
Black defendants and, conversely, victim impact testimony
might disproportionately magnify the loss of White victims
compared to non-White victims.”74 Therefore, due to what may
amount to implicit racial biases,75 capital jurors are often unable
72. Justin D. Levinson, Robert J. Smith & Danielle M. Young, Devaluing Death: An
Empirical Study of Implicit Racial Bias on Jury-Eligible Citizens in Six Death Penalty
States, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 513, 544 (2014) (explaining that the process of death
qualification leads to capital juries that are mostly comprised of White males).
73. Id. at 534-44 (discussing how racial stereotypes effect white jurors in capital
cases).
74. Id. at 517.
75. Several scholars and researchers now study implicit bias. In the death penalty
context, Professor Justin Levinson has done extensive work on this issue. In his article,
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to truly give effect to mitigating evidence when the defendant is
black, and may be using the race of the victim to inappropriately
add weight to aggravating factors when the victim is white.
Additionally, scholars have posited that retribution may be
“inextricably tied to race,” meaning that retribution “cannot be
contemplated without also considering the corresponding
impact” of racial arbitrariness.76 It is understood that retribution
is a necessary aspect of the constitutionality of the death penalty,
and that “racial arbitrariness is an impermissible consideration
for imposing capital punishment.”77 This argument about the
intertwining of the two concepts can be explained this way:
[T]he tendency to punish crimes against White Americans
more severely should have been reduced by the
combination of channeling society’s taste for retribution
into the formal justice system and requiring heavy antiarbitrariness procedural regulation in the administration of
capital punishment. This has not been the case.78

This view takes issue with the adequacy of the death
penalty process, which requires room for retribution, yet allows
for racial bias to influence that retributive determination.
However, there is another, blunter manner of interpreting the
consequences of the racial bias present in jury decisions on
death.
The racially disparate outcomes that we are witnessing in
the death penalty decisions may mean that jurors are actually
expressing retributive sentiments as their community of death
qualified jurors see things—that black capital defendants are
more morally blameworthy than white capital defendants; that
Devaluing Death: An Empirical Study of Implicit Racial Bias on Jury-Eligible Citizens in
Six Death Penalty States, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 513, 518 n.9 (May 2014), he suggests the
following resources for information on implicit bias social science research: Justin D.
Levinson, Danielle M. Young & Laurie A. Rudman, Implicit Racial Bias: A Social Science
Overview, in Implicit Racial Bias Across the Law, supra note 7, at 9; MAHZARIN R.
BANAJI, IMPLICIT ATTITUDES CAN BE MEASURED, IN THE NATURE OF REMEMBERING:
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT G. CROWDER 117, 123 (Henry L. Roediger III et al. eds.,
2001) (giving “a more theoretical perspective underlying work on implicit bias”); Anthony
G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem,
and Stereotypes, 102 Psychol. Rev. 4 (1995).
76. Levinson, supra note 72, at 517, 541.
77. Id. at 541.
78. Id.
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defendants who have taken the life of a white person are
especially deserving of the death penalty; and that black
defendants who take the life of a white person are the worst of
the worst capital defendants. When the justifications for death
penalty were discussed in Kennedy v. Louisiana, the Supreme
Court recognized that retribution “most often can contradict the
law’s own ends” because “[w]hen the law punishes by death, it
risks its own sudden descent into brutality, transgressing the
constitutional commitment to decency and restraint.”79 What
retribution in the context of the racial disparities in the death
penalty may be risking could be even worse than the brutality
that the Kennedy Court envisions. If racial animus actually
informs retribution completely, then capital jury decisions may
be forcing us to come face to face with our own societal position
that race actually determines when we believe that punishment
is deserved and when we are outraged by death.
We have actually seen a version of what I would call “racebased retribution” in the case Buck v. Davis which was recently
decided by the Supreme Court.80 The case is a procedural
nightmare and involves the proper standard for certificate of
availability, as well as what counts as extraordinary
circumstances for a Rule 60(b) motion to reopen a final
judgment.81 However, what is most relevant to the discussion
about the death penalty purpose and jury decision making is
what lay at the heart of Buck’s underlying claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel—sentencing hearing testimony by his own
expert psychologist witness that Buck being black was a
“statistical factor” that increased his probability of being a
danger in the future.82
“‘Future dangerousness’ [of the
defendant] is one of the ‘special issues’ that a Texas jury must
find to exist—unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt—
before a defendant may be sentenced to death.”83 The purported
expert’s reasons for using race in this assessment was not
anything about the particular defendant, but because, as he
79. 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008).
80. 137 S. Ct. 759 (2017).
81. Buck v. Stephens, 623 F. App’x 668, 672 (5th Cir. 2015).
82. Brief for Petitioner at 7, Buck v. Stephens, 623 F. App’x 668, No. 15-8049, 2016
WL 4073689, at *7.
83. Id. at 5 (citing Tex. Code. Crim. Proc. Art. 37.071 § 2).
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stated, “[i]t’s a sad commentary that minorities, Hispanics and
black people, are over represented in the Criminal Justice
System.”84 On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked, “You
have determined that the sex factor, that a male is more violent
than a female because that’s just the way it is, and that the race
factor, black, increases the future dangerousness for various
complicated reasons; is that correct?”85 The “expert” answered,
“Yes.”86 In other words, this psychologist was saying that
blackness makes someone more likely to be a future danger than
a white person. Under Texas law (and the law of many other
states), likely to be a danger in the future makes someone worse
than other capital offenders, and thus deserving of the death
penalty.87 So, in short, under this psychologist’s assessment,
being black means being more deserving of the death penalty
than others. This is race-based retribution. Mr. Buck was
sentenced to death.88 The Supreme Court’s decision to reverse
the decision below and remand the case for further consideration
indicates that the Court agreed that race-based retribution was at
play in Mr. Buck’s case. In discussing the ineffective assistance
of counsel claim, the Court stated:
Given that the jury had to make a finding of future
dangerousness before it could impose a death sentence, [the
Expert’s] report said, in effect, that the color of Buck’s skin
made him more deserving of execution. It would be
patently unconstitutional for a state to argue that a
defendant is liable to be a future danger because of his
race.89

Thankfully, the Supreme Court condemned this use of race
as a proxy for blameworthiness.90 But, the fact that the United
States Supreme Court had to step in to make such a

84. Id. at 7.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 8.
87. See Carla Edmonson, Nothing Is Certain but Death: Why Future Dangerousness
Mandates Abolition of the Death Penalty, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 857, 859-60, 862
(2016).
88. Brief for Petitioner at 8, Buck v. Stephens, 623 Fed. App’x 668, No. 15-8049,
2016 WL 4073689, at *7.
89. Buck v. Davis, 137 S.Ct. 759, 775 (2017).
90. Id.
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determination illuminates the inherent problems with the death
penalty.
The hypothesis that racial animus and retribution are one in
the same in capital cases is supported by studies that show a
difference in the racial dynamics of sentences of life
imprisonment and sentences of death. A study published in
2015 found that test respondents who were told that life without
parole was the maximum allowable sentence were not
significantly more likely to convict black than white
defendants.91 However, respondents who were told that the
death penalty was the maximum sentence, then those with black
defendants convicted eighty percent of the time while those with
white defendants convicted only fifty-five percent of the time.92
Though this study was specifically about the conviction rather
than the sentencing decision, it makes an important statement
about the perception of criminal desert—that in the death
penalty context (and probably throughout criminal justice
decisions) retribution can be an expression of racial bias. In that
regard, retribution is a failure.

C. General Deterrence
The principle of general deterrence supports punishment in
order to dissuade others in society from engaging in similar
conduct.93 When it comes to the deterrence rationale for the
death penalty, researchers have been unable to show that capital
punishment reduces the commission of capital crimes.94 This is
especially true when the deterrent effects of the death penalty
are measured against those of long periods of imprisonment.95

91. Jack Glaser et al., Possibility of Death Sentence Has Divergent Effect on Verdicts
for Black And White Defendants, 39 LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 539, 541-43 (2015).
92. Id. at 543.
93. Alicia K. Albertson, Criminalizing Bullying: Why Indiana Should Hold the Bully
Responsible, 48 IND. L. REV. 243, 264 (2014).
94. See Jordan Steiker, The American Death Penalty from A Consequentialist
Perspective, 47 TEX. TECH L. REV. 211, 212-13 (2014); see also Michael L. Radelet, The
Incremental Retributive Impact of A Death Sentence Over Life Without Parole, 49 U.
MICH. J. L. REFORM 795, 800 (2016) (“Most, although not all, of these studies [on general
deterrence] have found that the death penalty and homicide rates are basically
uncorrelated.”).
95. Radelet, supra note 94, at 800-01 (“Surveys conducted in the mid-1990s and a
dozen years later found that more than ninety percent of the nation’s leading criminologists
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Further, there is little to no evidence regarding the types of
factors (other than race of the defendant and/or victim) that will
more often result in the death penalty such that potential capital
criminals are on notice and can be deterred from their conduct.
Much of this may be due to the nature of the aggravating and
mitigating evidence that is supposed to guide juries’ decisions.
The problems with those factors have been described this way:
Some aggravating factors (for example, the fact that
the crime was heinous, vile, or wanton, or that the
defendant will be dangerous in the future) are said to be too
vague, ambiguous, or uncertain to provide any meaningful
guidance to the jury. Some factors listed as mitigators (for
example, mental or emotional disturbance, or drug/alcohol
involvement) may actually be regarded by jurors as
aggravators, owing to their presumed contribution to future
violence.96

In the same way that aggravating and mitigating factors are
not helpful to jurors, they are not helpful in informing
defendants about the types of criminal conduct that will more
likely result in the death penalty than life imprisonment.
Certainly a defendant will know that there is a risk of receiving
the death penalty if he commits a capital crime. However, if the
punishment of death is specifically needed to reduce the types of
crimes that would warrant the death penalty versus life
imprisonment, then the factors used by a jury do not reveal any
meaningful information about just what that means.
What is known about the imposition of the death penalty is
that location matters more than any specific, legitimate
characteristics of the offense or offender. Only two percent of
counties in the United States are responsible for the majority of
today’s death sentences.97 Looking to specific states, it is
evident that geography is a bigger determinate of whether the
death penalty will be imposed than anything that could possibly
have concluded that, based on their reading of the extant research, the death penalty fails to
deter homicides any more than long imprisonment does.”).
96. Bowers, supra note 48, at 1053.
97. Death Penalty Information Center, THE 2% DEATH PENALTY: HOW A MINORITY
OF COUNTIES PRODUCE DEATH SENTENCES AT AN ENORMOUS COST TO ALL iii (Oct.
2013)
http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/TwoPercentReport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/72BT-8T4K].
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be based on the differences in aspects of the crime. For
instance, prior to Connecticut abolishing the death penalty,
“geographical disparities in the application of the death penalty,
even when controlling for the differences in case characteristics”
were found there.98 Likewise, in California, a study by the
American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California
determined that:
In 2009, only six counties accounted for 96.6% of the death
sentences. Even more startling, just three counties—Los
Angeles, Orange, and Riverside—accounted for 83% of
death sentences in 2009. Only 41% of California’s
population lives in these counties. Together, these three
counties sentenced more people to die in 2009 than the
entire state did each year from 2002 to 2008.99

These stark geographic differences in the death penalty
certainly are an indictment of prosecutorial practices in seeking
the death penalty. However, this data also shows us that the
decision to impose death cannot possibly have anything to do
with an effort to deter capital crimes. There is nothing showing
that the frequency with which death is imposed in certain locales
as opposed to others reduces the commission of capital crimes in
those death-sentencing prone areas.
On the other hand, there is ample evidence that jurors begin
to make decisions about the appropriate punishment during the
trial phase of a capital case.100 The more strongly the juror is
convinced of the guilt of the defendant, the more likely the juror
will be in favor of a death sentence.101 This would suggest that
there is little that can be done at the sentencing phase to
convince a capital jury that death is not necessary given the
purposes of punishment. While this obviously speaks to the
retributive purpose, it also has implications for the general
deterrent function of the death penalty. It seems that whether or
not one receives the death penalty will have a lot more to do
with the race of the defendant and victim, where the case is
98. Id. at 11-12.
99. Id. at 12 (quoting J. DONOHUE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN CONNECTICUT, 19732007: A COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION FROM 4686 MURDERS TO ONE EXECUTION 8
(2011).).
100. Bowers, supra note 48, at 1087-90.
101. Id. at 89-90.
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tried, and the strength of the trial evidence rather than the type
of crime committed. This last factor, especially, means that
nothing can be gleaned from the death penalty decision about
the likelihood of receiving the death penalty before the crime is
committed. In other words, when the would-be criminal is
making a determination about whether to commit a deathworthy crime or not, it seems that his cost-benefit analysis must
include an assessment of how well his defense team would do
against the trial evidence presented by the state. Of course, this
would be impossible. Perhaps this is why the deterrence
function of the death penalty has been given short shrift, even by
the Supreme Court.102

V. CONCLUSORY IDEAS: HOW TO BE SMART ON
DEATH PENALTY REFORM
In today’s climate of sentencing reform, if a punishment is
not smart on crime, it should be revisited. With our severely
overcrowded prisons and extreme costs of incarceration,
sentencing reform is currently focused on reducing prison
populations in ways that still address crime-control needs.103
Thus, the harshest, incarcerative punishments are being saved
for violent, repeat offenders. And while this focus is on the
appropriate punishments for our least severe offenders, attention
needs to be paid to our most severe offenders as well. This is
especially true when death is on the table. When it comes to
capital punishment, there is little reason to believe that the actual
jury decisions to impose the death penalty are faithfully carrying
out retributive and general deterrent aims. When we actually
look at what we know about capital jury decisions in light of
sentencing purposes, we are left with jury decisions for which
the deterrent effect cannot be measured and the retributive
element is highly racist with no indication of appropriate
proportionality. This is despite the large costs associated with
102. Even at the outset of justifying capital punishment, the Supreme Court
recognized the difficulties of measuring the deterrent effect of the death penalty. See
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184-86 (1976). “Statistical attempts to evaluate the worth
of the death penalty as a deterrent to crimes by potential offenders have occasioned a great
deal of debate. The results simply have been inconclusive.” Id. at 184-85.
103. See generally Jelani Jefferson Exum, Sentencing, Drugs and Prisons: A Lesson
from Ohio, 42 U. Tol. L. Rev. 881 (2011) (discussing prison overcrowding and costs).
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sustaining the death penalty.104 If we include the death penalty
in the current smart on crime discourse, the argument for change
is quite strong.
To be fair, there have been several proposed changes to the
death penalty that are short of abolishing it all together. Calls
have been made for changing the way capital jurors are selected,
so as to not prime the jurors to select the death penalty,105 or to
reduce the race and gender disparities in the make-up of the
jury.106 Some have argued for adjustments to jury instructions
so that it is clearer to jurors that death is automatic upon the
finding of aggravating factors.107 But, in this regard, we may be
able to learn from the non-death context as well.
When the racial biases and purposeless sentencing
decisions of judges were contested, the result was the
development of sentencing guidelines throughout the country.108
Though guidelines themselves are not without problems, they
are intended to promote uniformity and transparency. The point
is to reduce sentencing arbitrariness while also allowing for
sentencing data to be collected so that sentencing law and
104. For a thorough discussion of the costs of the death penalty throughout the
country, see Death Penalty Information Center, SMART ON CRIME: RECONSIDERING THE
DEATH PENALTY IN A TIME OF ECONOMIC CRISIS (Oct. 2009) 14-22,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/reports [https://perma.cc/EY6H-8THQ].
105. As Levinson explained,
Although it has yet to be tested empirically, it is possible that even the
introduction of the penalty of death as an outcome possibility actually
“primes” the racial stereotype of violent and dangerous Black males.
Levinson has argued that media, culture, and a history of racial disparities in
the death penalty have led American citizens to cognitively associate the
death penalty with Black male perpetrators. If this hypothesis were
confirmed, simply talking about death as a possible penalty, the process of
death qualification, or both, could trigger (or prime) these racial stereotypes.
These triggered stereotypes of death-worthy Black perpetrators could
potentially prejudice the ensuing trial.
Levinson, supra note 72, at 550 (internal citations omitted).
106. See Melynda J. Price, Performing Discretion or Performing Discrimination:
Race, Ritual, and Peremptory Challenges in Capital Jury Selection, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L.
57, 106-07 (2009).
107. See Richard L. Weiner et al., Guided Jury Discretion in Capital Murder Cases:
The Role of Declarative and Procedural Knowledge, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 516,
570-71 (2004).
108. See generally Jelani Jefferson Exum, Why March to a Uniform Beat? Adding
Honesty and Proportionality to the Tune of Federal Sentencing, 15 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 141
(2010) (discussing the development and purposes of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
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practice may evolve and respond to societal needs.109 It is this
aspect of non-capital sentencing reform that should not be
precluded from the death penalty reform discussion. Thought
should be given to ways to make capital jury decision-making
more transparent so that it may be properly studied. This would
allow for the creation of proposals to address the areas where
capital jury decisions are not in line with legitimate retribution
or general deterrence goals, which would also help to promote
uniformity in the application of the death penalty. In upholding
the death penalty, the Supreme Court seems to have envisioned
such an approach. When addressing deterrence in Gregg v.
Georgia, the court explained:
The value of capital punishment as a deterrent of
crime is a complex factual issue the resolution of which
properly rests with the legislatures, which can evaluate the
results of statistical studies in terms of their own local
conditions and with a flexibility of approach that is not
available to the courts.110

In the federal system, this sort of statistical information
about a sentencing judge’s decisions is collected through the use
of a detailed statement of reasons form that can be analyzed by
the U.S. Sentencing Commission.111 Without more concrete,
explicit information on why jurors decide to impose death, we
are left with a sentencing decision that we cannot say does
anything to deter crime. And while the decision to impose death
may speak to retribution, that moral condemnation may often be
poisoned by impermissible factors that punish a person for their
race and the race of their victim, rather than some other
determination of whether they are deserving of life. Death is our
most severe punishment, but we have not paid adequate
attention to whether it is actually imposed in a manner that is
fulfilling its required purposes. While we have this void of
information about capital punishment decisions, we do know
that it is expensive, that we sometimes put innocent people to
death, and that we even botch executions. In light of this entire
109. Id.
110. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976).
111. For an interesting read on the evolution of the Statement of Reasons form, see
Jelani Jefferson Exum & Paul J. Hofer, The Evolution of the Statement of Reasons Form,
28 Fed. Sent. R. 169, 2016 WL 1417768 (Vera Inst. Just.) (2016).
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story, we may have to admit that we do not actually care about
getting sentencing right if we are unwilling to address these
shortcomings.
It could, of course, be that measuring how jurors make
capital decisions is an impossible task. When it comes to
deterrence, one scholar has pessimistically stated:
[A]fter all possible inquiry, including the probing of all
possible methods of inquiry, we do not know, and for
systematic and easily visible reasons cannot know, what the
truth about this “deterrent” effect may be . . . . The
inescapable flaw is . . . that social conditions in any state
are not constant through time, and that social conditions are
not the same in any two states. If an effect were observed
(and the observed effects, one way or another, are not large)
then one could not at all tell whether any of this effect is
attributable to the presence or absence of capital
punishment. A “scientific”—that is to say, a soundly
based—conclusion is simply impossible, and no
methodological path out of this tangle suggests itself.112

Perhaps, given the nature of jury decisions, we can never
understand what exactly motivates a jury to decide that death is
the only possible appropriate punishment in a given situation. If
that is the case, then we are admitting that we will never know if
the death penalty actually fulfills retribution and deterrence.
And, if retribution and deterrence are critical to the
constitutionality of the death penalty, it would seem that the
punishment’s very foundation is quite possibly nonexistent.
Certainly, we could argue that we are satisfied with the idea that
retribution and deterrence may be satisfied. However, given all
of the death penalty’s problems, it is hard to continue to
maintain that putting our resources behind an only theoretically
effective punishment is very smart on crime.

112. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 185. (quoting Charles L. Black, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT:
THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE 25-26 (1974)).

